


A Case for Type-System Based Network Security

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Network Security for IoT - Why it Matters



Mirai Botnet

- Enabled by factory-set passwords on Unix-based IoT devices with open ssh and telnet interfaces
- Most targets were IP cameras, home routers, and DVR's
- **Infected devices could attack any nodes on the Internet: exponential spread**
- ~500,000 infected devices [1]
- Made inaccessible: Github, Twitter, Reddit, Netflix, Airbnb, etc.

Network Security for IoT - Why it Matters

CNN BUSINESS

Markets Tech Media Success Perspectives Video

FDA confirms that St. Jude's cardiac devices can be hacked

St. Jude's cardiac pacemaker attack

- Attackers could issue shocks or change pacing remotely using RF commands from a distance
- Enabled by 24-bit RSA authentication + fixed override
- **Additionally, patient medical information was sometimes transmitted unencrypted**

Network Security for IoT - Why it Matters

German parents told to destroy doll that can spy on children

German watchdog classifies My Friend Cayla doll as 'illegal espionage apparatus' and says shops and owners could face fines

- Unencrypted transmission of data
- Unauthenticated access to device

Takeaways

- Most IoT attacks occur over the network, rather than via direct physical access to the device
- Important to restrict the damage that can be done even on a system with compromised components
- Encrypting communication by default is extremely important

Our Position

An embedded Operating System's network security should be defined in that languages type system.

Why?

- Tightly localized enforcement of network security → reduced audit space
- Compile-time checks reduce cost in code size and memory
- Puts security inline with code: keeps security at the forefront of the developers mind

Survey of embedded security approaches



- Process isolation
- File access permissions
- Namespaces
- Netfilter / iptables → in kernel firewall




- Capability based security
- Formally verified micro-kernel
- “Provably” bug free
- Kernel extension is a laborious process

Type system based security

Core concept: Capability-based security where each capability is a unique type in the OS programming language

- The compiler can track where capabilities are distributed
- Compiler enforces that only trusted code can *instantiate or modify* these types
- Example: written in Rust for the Tock Operating System


Introduction to Rust



Systems programming language focused on safety.

- Type safe
- Performance comparable to C/C++ (No GC)
- Memory Safe + Thread Safe: Does not allow null pointers, dangling pointers, or data races in *safe* code. **Unsafe** code (demarcated by the ``unsafe`` keyword) allows developers to break these guarantees
- Ownership: For a given object, can have either multiple immutable references or a single mutable reference

Tock Embedded Operating System



Example Network Capabilities

- (1) “Capsule A cannot listen to the radio”
- (2) “Capsule A cannot use the socket interface”
- (3) “Capsule C can not send data without first encrypting it”
- (4) “No two capsules can bind to the same UDP port”
- (5) “Capsule B can only communicate with IP addresses 10.0.0.5 and 146.72.80.1”
- (6) “Capsule D can talk to any node on the link-local network”

Tock today: Static capabilities

```
macro_rules! create_capability {  
  ($T: ty) => {{  
    struct Cap;  
    unsafe impl $T for Cap {}  
    Cap  
  }};  
}  
...  
let send_unencrypted = create_capability!(capabilities::SendUnencryptedCapability);
```

Pros:

- Zero code size
- Explicit passing of capabilities

Cons:

- Not extensible to non-binary capabilities

Static Capabilities - Not Enough

Static Capabilities cannot cover cases such as:

- “Capsule A can only communicate with IP addresses 10.0.0.5 and 146.72.80.1”
- “Capsule B can only communicate with ‘amazon.com’ and ‘nest.com’ domains”
- “Capsule C can bind to ports 500-1000”

Dynamic Capabilities - Leveraging the Type System

- Each dynamic capability is a type; the fields of that type encode the variable capabilities
- Example: Capability that controls which IP endpoints a capsule can communicate with
- The core kernel (trusted code) can create and modify dynamic capabilities
- Capsules (untrusted) can read dynamic capabilities

net_permissions.rs (core kernel)

```
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
pub enum AddrRange {
    Any, // Any address
    Range(u32, u32),
    Addr(u32),
}

pub struct IpPermission {
    remote_addrs: AddrRange, // not pub!
}
```

net_permissions.rs (core kernel)

```
impl IpPermission {
    pub unsafe fn new(addr: AddrRange) -> IpPermission {
        IpPermission {
            remote_addr: addr,
        }
    }
    pub fn get_remotes(&self) -> AddrRange {
        self.remote_addr
    }
}
}
```

ip.rs (capsule)

```
pub fn ip_send(dest: u32, permission: IpPermission, msg: String) -> Result<u8, ()> {
    let valid = match permission.get_remotes() {
        AddrRange::Range(start, end) => {
            if dest >= start && dest <= end {
                true
            } else {
                false
            }
        },
    };
    if valid {
        sixlowpan_send(...);
        return Ok(0);
    }
    Err(())
}
```

trusted_capsule.rs (capsule)

```
pub struct TrustedObject {
    permission: Option<IpPermission>,
}

impl TrustedObject {
    pub fn new(perm: IpPermission) -> TrustedObject {
        TrustedObject {
            permission: Some(perm),
        }
    }

    pub fn phone_home(self, msg: String) {
        self.permission.map(|perm| ip_send(63, perm, msg));
    }
}
```

untrusted_capsule.rs (capsule)

```
pub struct UntrustedObject {
    permission: Option<IpPermission>,
}

impl UntrustedObject {
    pub fn new(perm: IpPermission) -> UntrustedObject {
        UntrustedObject {
            permission: Some(perm),
        }
    }

    pub fn do_evil(self) {
        self.permission.map(|perm| ip_send(63, perm, "bad\n".to_string()));
    }
}
```

main.rs (Initialization Script) - correct use

```
let permission;  
unsafe {  
    permission = IpPermission::new(AddrRange::Any);  
}  
let result = ip_send(6, permission, "hello world\n".to_string());
```

```
let permission2;  
unsafe {  
    permission2 = IpPermission::new(AddrRange::Range(0, 100));  
}
```

```
let trusted = TrustedObject::new(permission2);  
trusted.phone_home("good_data\n".to_string());
```

untrusted_capsule.rs (Capsules) - Attempted misuse

```
pub fn do_evil(self) {  
    ip_send(63, NULL, "bad_data\n".to_string());  
}
```

Doesn't Compile - no NULL in Rust

untrusted_capsule.rs (Capsules) - Attempted misuse

```
pub fn do_evil(self) {  
    let permission = IpPermission::new(63);  
    ip_send(63, permission, "bad_data\n".to_string());  
}
```

Doesn't Compile: `error[E0133]: call to unsafe function is unsafe and requires unsafe function or block`

untrusted_capsule.rs (Capsules) - Attempted misuse

```
pub fn do_evil(self) {  
    let permission = IpPermission {  
        remote_addrs: AddrRange::Any,  
    }  
    ip_send(63, permission, "bad_data\n".to_string());  
}
```

Doesn't Compile - `error[E0616]: field `remote_addrs` of struct `permissions::IpPermissions` is private`

untrusted_capsule.rs (Capsules) - Attempted misuse

```
pub fn do_evil(self, permission) {  
    permission.remote_addrs = AddrRange::Any;  
    ip_send(63, permission, "bad_data\n".to_string());  
}
```

Doesn't Compile - `error[E0616]: field `remote_addrs` of struct `permissions::IpPermissions` is private`

main.rs (Initialization Script) - Attempted misuse

```
let permission3;  
unsafe {  
    permission3 = IpPermission::new(AddrRange::Addr(24));  
}
```

```
let untrusted = UntrustedObject::new(permission3);  
untrusted.do_evil();
```

Send fails at runtime.

Benefits - Reduced Audit Space

Tock ADC Component:

```
impl AdcComponent {
  pub fn new() -> AdcComponent {
    AdcComponent {}
  }
}

impl Component for AdcComponent {
  type Output = &'static adc::Adc<'static, sam4l::adc::Adc>;

  unsafe fn finalize(&mut self) -> Self::Output {
    let adc_channels = static_init!(
      [&'static sam4l::adc::AdcChannel; 6],
      [
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD1, // AD0
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD2, // AD1
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD3, // AD2
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD4, // AD3
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD5, // AD4
        &sam4l::adc::CHANNEL_AD6, // AD5
      ]
    );
  }
}
```

```
let adc = static_init!(
  adc::Adc<'static, sam4l::adc::Adc>,
  adc::Adc::new(
    &mut sam4l::adc::ADC0,
    adc_channels,
    &mut adc::ADC_BUFFER1,
    &mut adc::ADC_BUFFER2,
    &mut adc::ADC_BUFFER3
  )
);
sam4l::adc::ADC0.set_client(adc);

adc
}
```

Benefits - Reduced Audit Space

Tock UDP Networking Capsule :

- 12 Files, 4300 Lines of Code

Tock ADC Capsule:

- 850 Lines of Code

Tock UDP Component:

- 142 Lines of code

Tock ADC Component:

- 33 Lines of Code

Benefits - Explicit Security

- Capsule only compiles if it is given all the capabilities it needs
- These capabilities are all in line with the capsule's instantiation
- Capability distribution can be viewed directly alongside the relationships between capsules
- Capabilities are superior to ACLs for handling the confused deputy problem
 - “The Confused Deputy (or why capabilities may have been invented)” - http://www.isti.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg214/-368094-Pallavi_Jagannatha_confused_deputy.pdf

Open Problems / Next Steps

- Study the impact dynamic permissions have on efficiency/code size
- How to maintain separation of layers?
 - E.g. my UDP layer shouldn't know anything about my permissions at the link layer
- Confused Deputy Problem
 - How do we know that capabilities won't be shared beyond their intended use?
- Revocable Permissions
- Is expressing everything in the type system too restrictive?

Conclusion

- Security we want on IoT devices is very different than on POSIX
 - No users, no files → how should we express security and access policies?
 - Instead, may be the case that different components of code should have different abilities
 - Cannot interact with user to determine how to react in ambiguous scenarios
 - Should communication be default on or default off?
- IoT security models must be restrictive by default
 - Developers will follow path of least resistance
- IoT devices are infrequently updated, so security audits are even more important than on traditional systems
 - Accordingly, making audits easier is critical
 - Adding a single new library should not require auditing the entire system again
- Capabilities implemented using the type system provide a unique path towards achieving these goals at low cost